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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LANw-PoLICE POWVR AND EMINENT DOMAIN DISTINGUISHED.-
An act of a legislature authorized the defendant counties jointly to improve a
river separating the two to prevent floods. The result of straightening the chan-
nel was the erosion of the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff brought an action for
damages. Held, that the defendant counties were not excused by virtue of the
police power, the controlling purpose being the protection of the defendant's
roads and bridges and not the public health, peace, morals, or welfare. Conger
v. Pierce County (1921, Wash.) 198 Pac. 377.
In dealing with a difficult problem the court has reached a logical and just
result. No satisfactory test has yet been found by the courts to determine when
an injury to property constitutes a taking under eminent domain and when it is
to be justified under the police power. For a discussion of these principles, see
Freund, Police Power (1904) sec. 511-517.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEARCHES AND SEIZuREs-FOURTH AND FIFTH AMEND-
MENTS NO PROTECTION FROM WRONGFUL ACTS OF INDIvIDUALS.-The plaintiff's
private papers were stolen and turned over by the thief to the defendant, a
government official. The plaintiff filed a petition asking for the return of these
papers and for an injunction against their use as evidence. The trial court
granted the petition and the defendant appealed. Held, that the order should be
reversed as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protected the individual only
against the action of the Federal Government. Burdean v. McDowell (1921) 41
Sup. Ct. 574.
Had the papers been taken by government agents the plaintiff would have been
protected. See (1921) 30 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 769. But the court correctly
points out that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are no protection from the
wrongful acts of private individuals. See Weeks v. United States (914) 232
U. S. 383, 398, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 346. The Constitution not being violated, it is no
objection to the use of the evidence that it was illegally acquired. Benson v.
State (1921, Ark.) 233 S. W. 758; Briscoe v. State (1921, Ark.) 233 S. W. 761.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY OF SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-The plaintiff pur-
chased whiskey containing wood alcohol. Being blinded by drinking it, he sued
the seller's administratrix for damages, alleging an implied warranty of whole-
someness. Held, that as a contract for the sale of whiskey is illegal, it can not
be made the basis of a cause of action. Harkins v. Provenzo (1921, Sup. Ct.)
189 N. Y. Supp. 258.
The court relies on the general rule that an illegal contract will not be enforced.
Teachout v. Bogy (917) 175 Calif. 481, 66 Pac. 319. The unlawful act is the
sale of liquor and it is said that the injury is caused by drinking it and
not by its sale, an ingenious non sequitur. Britton's Adm'r. v. Samuels (1911)
143 Ky. 129, 136 S. W. 143. Even at common law a purchaser had no right to-
damages for injuries caused by his drinking liquor which had been sold to him.
Couchman v. Prother (1904) 162 Ind. 250, 70 N. E. 240; Buntin v. Hutton (1917)
2o6 Ill. App. 194.
DAMAGES-BANKS AND BANKING-LIABILITY OF BANK TO FIDUCIARY FOR
WRONGFUL DISHONOR OF CHECKS.-The defendant bank improperly dishonored a
check drawn by the plaintiff upon a deposit standing in his name as treasurer of a
church. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to substantial damages, but temper-
ate in amount De Launay v. Union Nat. Bank (1921, S. C.) io7 S. E. 925.
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A depositor may recover substantial damages from a bank improperly dis-
honoring his check, if he is a merchant. Some courts recognize no distinction
where the depositor is not a trader, but the general rule is that the ordinary
depositor may recover nominal damages only, unless special damage is proved.
Third Nat. Bank v. Ober (igxo, C. C. A. 8th) 178 Fed. 678; Grenada Bank v.
Lester (1921, Miss.) 89 So. 2. The court in the instant case extended the rule
providing for the recovery of substantial damages to a depositor who was merely
a fiduciary. The case would probably not be followed by these courts which
allow only merchant depositors to recover substantial damages, since the injury
did not affect the plaintiff's credit in his own business. For a discussion of the
subject, see (1920) 3o YALE LAw JOURNAL, 194.
INSURANCE-MUTuAL BENEFIT SoClirIEs-By-LAW ABOLISHING PREsUMPTION
OF DEATH.-The defendant, a mutual benefit society, expressly reserved in fts
contract of insurance the privilege to bind members by subsequently enacted by-
laws. This was also allowed by statute. Colo. Sess. Laws, 1911, ch. 139, sec. 8.
After issuance of the certificate in suit, but before the insured's disappearance,
the society enacted a by-law to the effect that absence without communication
should never entitle a beneficiary to recover on the certificate, until the full term
of the member's expectancy had expired, and provided that up to such expiration
premiums had been duly paid. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, as the by-
law was unreasonable, even though the certificate provided that the member
should be bound by all future changes in the by-laws, and notwithstanding the
statute. Modern Woodmen of American v. White (1921, Colo.) 199 Pac. 965.
How far mutual benefit societies may affect the rights of members by amend-
ing their by-laws, even when the privilege to amend is expressly reserved, is
uncertain. See (1912) 26 HA.v. L. REV. 18o; COMMENTS (1915) 24 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 337. But it is generally held that amendments which are unreasonable
are not binding. COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 239. By the weight
of authority the amendment in the instant case is not binding because unreason-
able. Fryer v. Modern Woodmen of America (1920, Iowa) 179 N. W. 16o;
Hannon v. Grand Lodge (1917). 99 Kan. 734, 163 Pac. 169; see L. R. A. 1917 C,
1O32, note; contra, Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America (192I), 296 IlL 1O4,
129 N. E. 546. For a discussion, see (1921) 30 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 300.
JURISDICTION-SERVICE OF PROCISS ON CORPORATION'S LOCAL MANAGING AGENT-
ADVERTISEMENTS AS EVIDENCE OF AENcy.-The plaintiff, engaged in business in
New York, entered into a contract in Chicago with the defendant, an Illinois cor-
poration. Difficulties arose and the plaintiff caused a summons to be served upon
one Besser, as the defendant's New York managing agent. It appeared, however,
that Besser was merely a broker, selling goods on commission for many concerns.
But the defendant had frequently advertised that it maintained a New York
office with Besser in charge. Held, that the advertisements justified the conclu-
sion that Besser was, in fact, a managing agent. Dreher v. Western Doll Mfg.
Co. (1921) 198 App. Div. 21, 189 N. Y. Supp. 422.
Section 229 of the New York Civil Practice Act authorizes service of summons
upon the managing agent of a foreign corporation. In the instant case, all orders
were accepted and accounts settled in Chicago, so it seems impossible to consider
the defendant as "doing business " in New York to such an extent as to render it
subject to that state's jurisdiction. See (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 205. The
mere fact that the defendant sold goods in New York did not constitute "doing
business" there. Day v. Schiff-Lang (1921, D. C. S. D. N. Y.) 66 N. Y. L. JoUR.
611 (Nov. 21, 1921). But the decision may be supported on the ground that the
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defendant, having induced people to trade with it on the representation that it
maintained a New York office, is estopped from denying that fact for the purpose
of avoiding a summons.
PERsos-LiAr.trry OF HusBANb FOR WIFE'S CumF-The defendant's wife,
with his knowledge, distilled and sold whiskey in their home. They were jointly
charged with a violation of the liquor laws. Mich. Pub. Acts, 1917, Act 338, sec.
2, as amended by Pub. Acts, 1919, Act 53. The wife pleaded guilty. Held, that
the defendant was guilty. People v. Sybisloo (1921, Mich.) 184 N. W. 410.
At common law 'the wife, in committing a crime in the presence of her husband,
was presumed to do so under his coercion. Cothron v. State (1921, Md.) 113
Atl. 62o. Because of the increased personal freedom of the wife, this presump-
tion has been greatly weakened and in some cases destroyed. King v. City of
Owensboro (192o) 187 Ky. 21, 218 S. W. 297, commented on (192o) 29 YALE LAW
JouRxAL, 8o2. The instant case, however, does not rest on the presumption
of coercion. The crime, being inalur prohibitum, did not require the specific
intent of the husband, and his liability was based on his position as head of the
,house, with authority to control its management. This appears to be the general
rule as to criminal acts not inalurm in se committed by the wife in the home.
Schouler, Domestic Relatiois (5th ed. 1895) ch. 2, sec. 50.
PROPiRTY-ESToPPEL-AcQuIESCENCE IN BUILDING OPaRATIoNs ON OWNm'RS
LAND.-The defendant erected a tenement house which, due to a mistake in the
location of the division line, partly encroached upon the adjoining land of the
plaintiff's intestate. The latter was repeatedly on the premises during the con-
struction, but was unaware of the fact that the building was partly on his land.
After the erection of .the building the defendant enclosed more of the land with
a fence, in the location of which the intestate acquiesced. The defendant at all
times had access to the recorded deeds showing the boundary lines. Held, that the
plaintiff should not be estopped from asserting his title to the land. Monterosso
v. Kent (1921, Conn.) 113 Atl. 922.
In an estoppel with respect to the title to real property, an intent to deceive is
required, or such gross negligence as would evidence such intent. Battle v.
Claiborne (1915) 133 Tenn. 286, i8o S. W. 584; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
( 4th ed. igi8) sec. 8o7. It is the general rule that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel cannot be applied when both parties know, or have the same means of
ascertaining, the facts. Powers v. Trustees of Grammar School (1919) 93 Vt.
220, io6 At]. 836; Fellows v. National Can Co. (1919, C. C. A. 6th) 257 Fed. 970;
Pomeroy, op. cit. sec. 81o.
WiLLs-EFFEcT OF CoNvIcTION OF DEVISEE FOR MURDER OF C-DEvisEE.--A
testator devised property to his wife and son equally and provided that if the wife
predeceased the son, the entire property should go to the son. The latter was
convicted of her murder and committed suicide. His widow brought dn action
to quiet title to the property. A statute provided that no person feloniously
taking the life of another should inherit from such person or take anything
by devise or legacy. Iowa Code Supp. 1913, sec. 3386. Held, that the murderer's
widow should succeed to the entire estate. In re Emerson's Estate (1921, Iowa)
183 N. W. 327.
The decision is a strict interpretation of the statute. The devisor himself must
have been murdered; the killing of one whose death merely enlarged the estate
does not cause forfeiture. For a discussion of the general subject, see (1918) 27
YA.E LAW JoURNA, 964; (1919) 28 ibid. 514.
